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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah Transit Authority ("UTA") claims to agree with Salt Lake City Southern 
Railroad Company, Inc. ("SLCSR") that the provisions of the Administration and 
Coordination Agreement ("Agreement") at issue in this case are clear and unambiguous. 
UTA, however, appears to be less than sure that the Agreement's language supports its 
position since it relies heavily upon what it claims to be parol evidence. This is 
particularly interesting since the parol evidence relied upon by UTA is not evidence at all. 
It is merely a recitation of what UTA erroneously claimed to be the facts before the trial 
court. Many of those facts are disputed and not supported by any evidence of record, as 
set forth in SLCSR's own statement of facts in its opposition memorandum before the 
trial court R. 509-39. SLCSR's opposition statement before the trial court is supported 
by the evidence of record. R. 604-737. Without conceding any of UTA's erroneous 
statements, SLCSR discusses here some of the correct facts that are misstated by UTA. 
UTA states that SLCSR has taken the position that its easement gave it "exclusive 
use" of UTA's property until UTA eventually commenced passenger service. SLCSR 
never took that position. The easement did not, and could not, extend that far. All the 
easement did was grant SLCSR the use of UTA's property exclusively for freight service, 
both before and after passenger service commenced. UTA always retained all other 
rights to its property. See, e ^ , Agreement, Sections 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 
5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.7, 6.1 and 6.2. In fact, the subject Agreement exists to clarify and 
coordinate SLCSR's limited use of some of UTA's property so as not to interfere with 
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UTA's use of its own property. Id. at preamble. 
SLCSR acquired from Union Pacific Railroad Co. an easement, and nothing more. 
That easement allowed SLCSR to operate freight trains over certain UTA property. 
SLCSR disputes the implication that UTA could not use its own property to construct its 
light rail system (TRAX) and thereafter use it. For this absurd position, UTA cited before 
the district court only the testimony of Mr. Jackson who was a manager of SLCSR. Mr. 
Jackson actually testified, at the pages cited by UTA, that SLCSR had the exclusive right 
only to "operate" freight trains over UTA's property. Mr. Jackson did not testify that 
UTA's right to possess its property, and get it ready for passenger service, or UTA's right 
to control its property, did not exist along with SLCSR's narrow right to use UTA's 
property only for freight operations. Mr. Jackson did not testify that UTA did not possess 
and could not improve or alter its own crossing surfaces to eliminate small gaps between 
the rubber panels. To the contrary, he testified that UTA was in fact improving its 
crossing surfaces, even before the bicycle accident that is the subject of the Goebels' 
action. 
UTA also states that the conduct of SLCSR employees proves SLCSR's 
obligation under the Agreement. UTA cited Mr. Martinez who said that he, as a track 
inspector for SLCSR, believed he had a responsibility to look for conditions at crossings 
that might present a dangerous situation to anyone, including bicyclists. Mr. Martinez 
was not asked if he inspected for compliance with the landowner's duties to bicyclists. 
There is no evidence Mr. Martinez even knew what such legal duties were at the time. 
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Mr. Martinez merely explained that if he saw something wrong with a crossing he fixed 
it, such as drive a screw into a loose rubber pad, replace a loose wooden plank, or fill in a 
hole. He believed he had a duty to look for problems that might affect train movement on 
the track as well as to look for hazards that might affect the public. There is no evidence 
Mr. Martinez knew anything about the Agreement or believed small gaps in between the 
large rubber pads of UTA's crossing surfaces posed an unreasonable hazard to bicyclists. 
Moreover, there is no evidence he ever eliminated any such gap between rubber pads. 
SLCSR's payment of a minor property damage claim to a woman who alleged that 
a crossing gate at a different crossing fell and hit her windshield is not material. Before 
the trial court, UTA conceded that the decision to pay that claim came from San Antonio, 
and there is no evidence the decision maker construed or even considered the Agreement 
in deciding to pay for a windshield damaged by a crossing gate that had fallen. Even if 
the Agreement had been considered, the decision to pay for the broken windshield would 
not be inconsistent with SLCSR's narrow duty to maintain signal facilities on Joint 
Trackage in the condition they were in at the time the Agreement was signed. It makes 
sense that when a crossing arm falls it is not in the "good condition" it was at the time the 
Agreement was signed. Also, it makes sense not to waste time and money over such an 
insignificant claim. Payment of insignificant claims w/irelated to defects in the materials 
of UTA's crossing surfaces does not prove SLCSR agreed to eliminate or ever eliminated 
such defects. 
Also, SLCSR's payment of claims for flat tires caused by loose spikes is not 
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material. There is no evidence that the person(s) who made the decision to pay such 
claims construed or even considered the Agreement in deciding to pay for a flat tire 
damaged by a spike. Again, even if the Agreement had been considered, the decision to 
pay for a flat tire would be consistent with SLCSR's narrow duty to maintain trackage to 
the standard deemed necessary for freight service and to preserve grade crossings it used 
in the condition they were in when the Agreement was executed. When a spike comes 
out, rail stability is decreased such that the track is no longer in the "good condition" it 
was in at the time the Agreement was signed. Also, it makes sense not to waste time and 
money over such insignificant claims. Payment of insignificant claims unrelated to gaps 
in UTA's crossing surface materials does not prove SLCSR agreed to eliminate or ever 
eliminated such gaps. 
With respect to UTA's statement that it referred claims from private citizens to 
SLCSR, it must be clarified that from the evidence presented to the trial court, it is clear 
this only occurred with respect to the minor claims just discussed. UTA cited to one of its 
employees who identified only two claims, one involving a crossing arm that came down 
and damaged a windshield and the other a spike that damaged a tire. He stated that he has 
no recollection of any other claims. R. 268-70. 
It is undisputed that since 1992, UTA has owned its Right-of-Way and always 
planned to upgrade its Right-of-Way with a light rail system. UTA anticipated rebuilding 
all of the line it acquired from UP, including refurbishing all street crossings- R. 620-
21, 629-30. UTA made the decisions of what it would do with its railroad line before it 
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began its passenger service, including the decision to upgrade all crossing surfaces with 
concrete. This decision was made sometime in 1996-1997, long before the Goebel 
accident. R. 614-19, 624-26. In fact, UTA paid for the new concrete surface at the 
subject crossing, which was done before passenger service began, as part of UTA's 
efforts to rebuild its entire system for passenger service. R. 633. None of these crossing 
improvements were made by SLCSR or even with its input. 
All of UTA's trackage, except for the tracks that are on city streets and the side 
track to UTA's yard, were declared by UTA to be Joint Trackage. R. 612-13. UTA, 
along with a representative of SLCSR, inspected the trackage SLCSR needed to use for 
its freight service in order to obtain a mutual understanding of the condition of UTA's 
property that SLCSR would be using and expected to preserve. R. 623, 630-31. That 
inspection did not focus on any gaps in crossing surface materials, and UTA has no 
knowledge of the state of existing gaps as of the date of the Agreement. R. 622, 627-28, 
631-32. 
UTA's employee most knowledgeable about the Agreement, Crosby Meacham, 
testified at the Goebel trial that: 1) everyone knew before the subject bicycle accident that 
UTA was going to replace the subject crossing; 2) UTA also was then engaged in at least 
two reconstruction projects at other crossings; 3) in 1993 or 1994, UTA inventoried its 
crossings, including the subject crossing, to make sure SLCSR would preserve them to 
that condition, and UTA did not look to see whether there were any gaps in the crossing 
surface materials; 4) he never thought SLCSR would address gaps in UTA's crossing 
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surface materials; 5) he never looked for gaps when determining the crossings were in 
"good condition." R. 634-46. 
Inasmuch as UTA has raised irrelevant extrinsic evidence about SLCSR's conduct, 
SLCSR is compelled to herein present the facts as they are supported by the record: 
A. Mr. Fred Byle testified in his deposition in the Goebel matter that: 1) he was 
at one time the general manager of SLCSR; 2) he recalled a dispute over who was going 
to inspect UTA's track because that responsibility, in his experience, fell to the track 
owner - UTA; 3) he ultimately agreed that SLCSR would inspect for compliance with 
Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulations because he did not want to get into 
a dispute with UTA and SLCSR needed the track to be compliant with FRA regulations 
to be able to operate trains over it; 4) for that reason he contracted with a retired FRA 
inspector, Mr. Martinez, to do the FRA inspections; 5) Mr. Byle personally inspected the 
track with UTA and no irregularities were noticed regarding any crossing surfaces; 6) in 
his experience track inspections normally do not include checking for gaps or cracks in 
crossing surfaces; 7) UTA's Memorandum of Agreements and Understandings (see Opp. 
Brief at 9 n. 1) arose out of the FRA finding UTA was violating track safety regulations; 
8) he never saw the Agreement, and he knew nothing about it; 9) his mind set toward 
maintenance was that UTA was tearing up and renewing its railroad, including replacing 
crossing surfaces, so SLCSR addressed only minor issues for FRA compliance, and FRA 
regulations do not pertain to crossing surfaces; 10) it never occurred to him that a bicycle 
accident could be caused by the small gaps in rubber crossing surface materials; 11) it 
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never occurred to him to monitor the condition of crossing surfaces for bicyclists; 12) he 
never heard of bicycle accidents caused by gaps in between rubber pads; 13) UTA was 
working on its line building the light rail system before the accident. R. 647-71. 
B. Mr. Russell Jackson testified at his deposition in the Goebel matter that: 1) 
he was one of a few employees of SLCSR; 2) SLCSR only owned minimal equipment for 
its freight operations; 3) he had no experience inspecting or maintaining railroad track; 4) 
SLCSR contracted with Mr. Martinez to do inspections and minor maintenance, primarily 
for compliance with FRA regulations; 5) UTA was working on the line while SLCSR 
used it, and SLCSR knew UTA would be replacing all its crossings with new surfaces; 6) 
he had no understanding that there should not be small gaps between the rubber pads and 
he never considered or was told by others that gaps posed a hazard to bicyclists; 8) he did 
not believe SLCSR was responsible to inspect or repair UTA's crossing surface materials 
to be safe for bicyclists; 9) he did not know SLCSR's actual contractual duties; 10) 
SLCSR never did major repairs to UTA's crossings; and 11) SLCSR notified UTA of 
major problems of which SLCSR was aware for UTA to address, and that was done 
before UTA used its line for passenger service. R. 672-705. 
C. Mr. John Martinez testified during his deposition in the Goebel matter that: 
1) he retired from the FRA, then later went to work part time (one day a week) for 
SLCSR inspecting track, for FRA compliance; 2) FRA regulations do not pertain to 
crossing surfaces; 3) he has no knowledge of any contract between the parties; 4) he 
never concerned himself with the rubber pads, but if he saw something he thought was 
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unsafe he fixed it; 5) he has seen gaps in between rubber pads, but he never believed they 
presented a safety problem; 6) he never considered what was not safe at a crossing for 
bicyclists; 7) he never heard of a bicyclist being hurt from getting bicycle tires trapped in 
a seam in the surface of a crossing; 8) he never filled in any gaps at any crossing while 
working for SLCSR; 9) if he had seen the gap the Goebels photographed, he would not 
have done anything about it. R. 713-37. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT STATE THAT SLCSR ASSUMED 
ALL OF UTA'S OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THE PARTICULAR DUTY 
AT ISSUE PERTAINING TO AN ALLEGED DEFECT IN THE CROSSING 
SURFACE MATERIALS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UTA WAS 
IMPROPER. 
UTA's first argument is based upon an incorrect factual premise, and therefore 
fails as a matter of law. UTA contends that summary judgment was properly granted for 
it and against SLCSR because "SLCS[R] assumed all maintenance obligations." (Opp. 
Brief at 18.) It is UTA's theory that maintenance obligations over Joint Trackage 
coincided with "use" of the Joint Trackage; thus, UTA avers, since SLCSR was the sole 
user (operator) of UTA's Joint Trackage it also was solely responsible to improve UTA's 
property for the benefit of bicyclists. UTA claims this theory is supported by the clear 
language of the Agreement which imposes a common statutory and ordinance based tort 
duty onto SLCSR as a "user" of UTA's track, and which does not limit SLCSR's 
obligations. UTA is wrong. 
UTA's position must be viewed in the actual context of this case. Indemnity is 
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sought by both parties against the other for "Loss or Damage" as defined in their 
Agreement and which includes attorneys' fees and defense expenses. Both parties 
suffered this type of Loss or Damage only when they were sued by the Goebels. The 
Goebels' suit was based on injuries suffered when Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheels allegedly 
fell into a "gap" in the materials used to construct the surface of UTA's crossing - rubber 
panels laid side-by-side. UTA relies on Section 7.2(a) of the Agreement for its indemnity 
claim which provides for indemnity when "Loss or Damage results from or arises in 
connection with the maintenance, construction, operations or other acts or omissions of 
only one of the parties." 
Thus, to be entitled to indemnity from SLCSR, UTA has to show that its Loss or 
Damage results from or arises in connection with the "omission" of not remedying the 
"gap" in the materials used to construct the surface of UTA's crossing, and that the 
claimed "omission" was SLCSR's and not UTA's. Obviously, if there was a defect, both 
parties failed to remedy the defect. Thus, the issue becomes who had the duty to remedy 
that defect. Without a duty to act, an omission is meaningless. Therefore, in order to 
prevail, it is imperative that UTA show that SLCSR alone assumed the duty to remedy 
the alleged defect that is the subject of the Goebels' action and that UTA did not also 
have that particular duty. 
A. A Contractual Duty to Make Crossing Surfaces Gap-Free for Bicyclists 
Does Not Exist From SLCSR's Use of UTA's Tracks for Freight 
Service, Regardless of Whether or Not UTA Also Was Using Its Tracks 
for Passenger Service. 
"Maintenance" duties generally do not arise merely from use, as UTA contends. 
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Under the Agreement, "maintenance" obligations correspond with UTA's chosen 
designation of its track as Joint, Passenger or Freight Trackage which designations were 
made by UTA long before UTA began using its property for passenger service. The 
subject crossing was part of track designated by UTA as Joint Trackage. Thus, Section 
3.3 of the Agreement is the section that pertains to what the parties agreed with respect to 
"maintenance, repair and renewal" of Joint Trackage. Nothing in Section 3.3 states that it 
applies to whoever "uses" Joint Trackage. Instead, Section 3.3 states that it applies to 
track designated as Joint Trackage, and Section 3.4 provides that when UTA begins its 
passenger services over that track, UTA then, only after written notice, is to assume "all" 
"maintenance, repair and renewal" of Joint Trackage. The parties clearly know how to 
provide when one or the other had all maintenance, repair and renewal obligations. 
Unlike Section 3.4, Section 3.3 is clearly limited. 
Before UTA gave notice of its assumption of "all" "maintenance, repair and 
renewal" responsibilities over Joint Trackage, Section 3.3 applied in imposing contractual 
"maintenance, repair and renewal" obligations onto SLCSR to maintain such trackage "to 
the standards it [SLSCR] deems necessary for Freight Rail Service." Section 3.3 
clearly does not impose any obligation onto SLCSR to make UTA's crossing surface 
materials gap-free for bicyclists which UTA never has argued is a condition SLCSR 
deemed to be necessary for freight service. On its face, Section 3.3 did not require 
SLCSR to eliminate the alleged defect the Goebels claim to be the cause of the subject 
bicycle accident. Such language did not magically appear simply because SLCSR was 
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using the track at the crossing for freight service and UTA was not yet using it for 
passenger service. 
B. Section 3.3 of the Agreement Does Not Impose the Contractual Duty 
Onto SLCSR to Maintain, Repair and Renew UTA's Crossings to be 
Better Than They Were or to Make Them Comply with Statutory 
Duties. 
Section 3.3 is expressly limited to "maintenance, repair and renewal of Joint 
Trackage." It has nothing to do with improving Joint Trackage for any purpose, including 
to be gap-free for bicyclists. It does not impose onto SLCSR all of UTA's duties that 
otherwise may exist by law. 
SLCSR always has agreed that its duty under Section 3.3 included the non-
discretionary minimum maintenance of Joint Trackage "so as to preserve the present 
condition of.. . grade crossings" which was only to their existing "good condition." 
Nowhere can it be found that the condition of UTA's crossings at the time the Agreement 
was entered included gap-free surfaces. Nowhere can it be found that "good" means 
"gap-free." The "present condition" and "good condition" of UTA's crossings is found in 
a clause pertaining to minimum maintenance obligations, not improvement obligations. 
This clause cannot broaden SLCSR's limited contractual obligation beyond what is 
necessary to maintain what is worn out or broken during its use of UTA's property for 
freight service. 
Neither can the last sentence in Section 3.3 broaden SLCSR's limited obligation. 
That sentence begins by expressly recognizing the limited maintenance obligation, by 
stating that "[n]othing herein shall relieve [SLCSR] of the obligation . . .." This language 
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would not be used if the preceding language were not limiting in nature. This sentence 
then expressly pertains solely to SLCSR's performance, not the scope of what is to be 
performed. It imposes the duty to "perform" maintenance "in a good and workman-like 
manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations." It does not impose 
the duty to maintain anything in addition to what is previously stated in this section. 
SLCSR only is obligated by this sentence not to perform shoddy work and not to violate 
the law when performing the limited maintenance it agreed to do. 
Conspicuously absent from Section 3.3 is any obligation to do "all" maintenance, 
as UTA agreed to do in Sections 3.2 (Passenger Trackage) and 3.4 (Joint Trackage after it 
gives notice upon commencement of passenger service). Nothing in Section 3.3 imposes 
any obligation onto SLCSR to improve UTA's crossings or to make sure they are not in a 
condition that violates any particular law, including any statutory or ordinance based law 
to maintain reasonably safe crossings for the bicycling public. The Agreement simply 
does not say what UTA contends. The relevant duty at issue was not imposed onto 
SLCSR through the parties' Agreement. 
C. The Agreement Certainly Does Impose Limitations Onto What SLCSR 
Can Do On And To UTA's Property. 
SLCSR agrees with UTA that Sections 2.1 and 4.1 must be read in conjunction 
with Section 3.3 discussed above. SLCSR rejects UTA's strawman position that these 
sections also expressly refer to a "maintenance" obligation. SLCSR has never taken that 
position. SLCSR's position, which is not denied by UTA, is that these sections reveal 
contractual limitations placed on SLCSR that are in harmony with the limited 
-12-
maintenance obligation agreed to by SLCSR in Section 3.3. UTA concedes that sections 
2.1, 5.1 and 5.4 limit the type of business activities SLCSR can perform on UTA's 
property and when it can perform them. (Opp. Brief at 27.) UTA concedes that Section 
4.1 precludes SLCSR from modifying Joint Trackage without UTA's approval. (Id. at 
29.) It cannot be overemphasized that UTA agreed that SLCSR "shall have no right or 
obligation to conduct" "any . . . activity whatsoever on [UTA's] Right-of-Way [including 
all trackage and crossings] that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service." Section 2.1. 
As to this point, it also warrants further emphasis that the Goebels' action alleged a 
failure to affirmatively address a defect in the materials and construction of the subject 
crossing surface, specifically what Goebels called a "gap" existing between rubber panels 
that necessarily must abut each other. The Goebels may have alleged a "maintenance" 
breach, but with semantics aside, it clearly was an "upgrade" breach. It is undisputed that 
all planked and rubberized crossing surfaces had and have seams, or gaps. They exist 
where the planks or rubber panels abut each other. The development of gaps cannot be 
avoided, nor can they be eliminated without reconstructing the crossing surface. UTA 
replaced all its crossing surfaces to be made with cement panels, but even they have 
seams, or gaps, where the cement panels meet. The liability issue in Goebel simply was 
whether the defendants should have eliminated a particular gap in between two rubber 
panels that the Goebels' alleged to be the cause of Mr. Goebel's bicycle accident. 
Nothing in the Agreement suggests SLCSR had the right, let alone the contractual duty, to 
reconstruct UTA's crossing surfaces in an effort to eliminate gaps. 
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The additional sections of the Agreement discussed by UTA, along with Section 
3.3 that pertains to "maintenance," should be read together, as UTA concedes, to find that 
SLCSR never agreed therein to maintain, upgrade, improve, alter (or whatever) UTA's 
crossing surfaces to be free of defects for bicyclists. Together, these sections show a 
clear limitation of SLCSR's obligations, and even its rights, to coincide with its freight 
services. 
D. UTA Retained All Obligations Pertaining to its Property Not Otherwise 
Agreed to by SLCSR. 
The Joint Trackage at issue was UTA's property. UTA remained the owner at all 
times. There was no lease or other transfer to SLCSR. UTA cannot deny its right and 
obligation to improve its crossings. UTA was in the process of upgrading its crossing 
surfaces before Mr. Goebel's accident. UTA had planned some type of improvement at 
the time it entered the Agreement. Indeed, the Agreement was entered into by the parties 
to coordinate SLCSR's limited use of UTA's property during the period of time that UTA 
was upgrading its property in anticipation of providing TRAX services. In the preamble 
to the Agreement, the parties stated that their intent was to clarify and establish their 
respective rights and obligations in light of SLCSR's use of UTA's property for freight 
services. In this context, the clearly limited rights and obligations pertaining to use of 
UTA's property by SLCSR for freight services cannot mean anything other than UTA 
retained all other rights and obligations pertaining to its own property. 
It is absurd for UTA to suggest that in addition to the very limited rights and 
obligations expressly stated in the Agreement, SLCSR has all other rights and obligations 
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to and over UTA's property not expressly stated to be retained by UTA. Section 2.1, 
discussed above, expressly disposes of UTA's position. Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 do so 
by implication. Those sections use the word "all" when discussing maintenance 
obligations of the parties over other types of designated trackage or after the required 
notice regarding passenger service over Joint Trackage. That word does not appear in 
Section 3.3. UTA suggests that "all" is used elsewhere only when referring to costs of 
maintenance, but that makes no difference with respect to Section 3.3. In Section 3.3, the 
responsibility for and the costs of maintenance are discussed together and are followed by 
the limiting clause, "to the standards it [SLCSR] deems necessary for Freight Rail 
Service," without the word "all." At a minimum, the failure to use the word "all" that is 
used in other sections cannot mean SLCSR assumed the risk of all non-retained 
obligations of UTA over its Joint Trackage. 
There can be only one reasonable conclusion from the language of the Agreement. 
SLCSR did not agree to assume the risk of ensuring UTA's crossing surface materials on 
Joint Trackage were free of defects for bicyclists. Thus, SLCSR cannot be held to have 
had the contractual duty to have reconstructed UTA's crossings, before UTA got around 
to doing it, to be gap-free. SLCSR cannot be held to have the obligation to indemnify 
UTA when UTA is sued as the property owner for having a gap-related defect in its 
crossing surface materials that it had not yet gotten around to replacing. 
E* SLCSR's Conduct Under the Agreement is Not Relevant. 
UTA misstates the law in discussing its point that the intent of the parties should 
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be determined from their conduct. Recent Utah law is to the contrary. "If the contract is 
in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be 
determined from the words of the agreement." Enerco v. SOS Staffing Services Inc., 
2002 UT 78, If 10, 52 P.3d 1272, 1274 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 
108 (Utah 1991)). Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp.. 266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1964), cited by 
UTA, is inconsistent with modern authority and never has been followed in Utah on this 
point. UTA does not dispute current Utah law nor claim ambiguity. Therefore, SLCSR's 
conduct is irrelevant as a matter of law. 
Moreover, the conduct of SLCSR is factually irrelevant. The issue is whether the 
Agreement imposed the duty onto SLCSR to ensure crossing surfaces on all Joint 
Trackage were free of defects for cyclists. Nothing in SLCSR's course of performance 
shows it tried to make any crossings gap-free for bicyclists by changing out the materials 
that were used in constructing UTA's crossings or by doing anything else. SLCSR 
merely inspected and maintained trackage it used so that the trackage would sustain usage 
for freight services, and when it saw a particular hazard had developed it either repaired 
the hazard or referred it to UTA for repair. All of SLCSR's conduct is consistent with its 
limited right and obligation to maintain the trackage it used to the standard it deemed 
necessary for freight service and to repair hazards that developed during its use. For a 
discussion of these irrelevant facts, SLCSR refers the Court to the above Statement of 
Facts. 
F. The Goebel Decision Does Not Impose a Relevant Duty Onto SLCSR. 
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The Court should not be confused by the parties5 discussion of a statutory and 
ordinance based tort duty to bicyclists. UTA acknowledges that as the owner of its 
railroad property, a tort duty applies to it. (Opp. Brief at 23.) It does not matter whether a 
tort duty also applies to SLCSR because the issue in this indemnity action is how UTA 
and SLCSR contracted with respect to who would be responsible for what duties. 
SLCSR merely pointed out in its initial brief that the Goebels' action against UTA 
and SLCSR was based on an alleged breach of a tort duty, and that SLCSR argued in the 
Goebel action and pointed out in this action that the alleged tort duty did not apply to 
SLCSR as a non-owner of UTA's property which SLCSR only used and did not operate. 
SLCSR only made this point as a lead-in to the critical point that UTA owed a tort duty to 
the Goebels as the owner of its property. It is SLCSR's position that the Agreement did 
not transfer UTA's landowner based tort duty onto SLCSR, particularly any duty to 
ensure that UTA's crossing surface materials were reasonably safe for bicyclists. Thus, 
since SLCSR did not contractually assume the particular obligation of UTA to ensure that 
its crossings were free of defects and reasonably safe for the public, UTA is not entitled 
to indemnity from SLCSR for UTA's defense of the Goebels' action pertaining to a 
defective crossing due to an alleged gap in the crossing materials. 
UTA contends the premise for SLCSR's position is undermined by the Utah 
Supreme Court's holding in Goebel. UTA believes the Goebel holding establishes that 
SLCSR also owed a tort duty to the Goebels. UTA takes this position in order to confuse 
this Court into accepting the incorrect position that it has to overturn the Goebel holding 
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before it can rule in favor of SLCSR. SLCSR does not ask that Goebel be overturned. 
The Goebel holding does not have to be overturned in order to rule in favor of SLCSR in 
this case. 
It does not matter if SLCSR also under the law owed a tort duty to the Goebels 
along with UTA. SLCSR believes the Goebel ruling is suspect, as explained in its initial 
brief, as to any such duty owed by SLCSR. Yet the Goebel ruling clearly applies to 
"owners" like UTA. But, more importantly, the Goebel decision does not address and 
does not control this Court's interpretation of the Agreement between the parties before 
it. It is the parties' contractual duties, not any tort duty owed to the Goebels, that control 
here. The language of the Agreement controls whether UTA, SLCSR or both had the 
contractual obligation to ensure that the materials used in the construction of UTA's 
crossing surfaces on Joint Trackage were free of defects for bicyclists. In fact, the parties 
expressly agreed that, as to the issue of indemnity, each "will pay for all Loss or Damage 
the risk of which it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court to the contrary and 
otherwise applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding." Section 7.3 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the important point is that, as between SLCSR and UTA, UTA retained the 
obligation to ensure its own crossing surfaces were constructed in a manner and with 
materials to be free of defects for bicyclists, an activity unrelated to SLCSR's freight 
services or the performance of maintenance necessary for or because of freight services. 
SLCSR also has taken the position before this Court that if it does not follow the 
above-stated clause of Section 7.3, and instead assigns duties to UTA and SLCSR in 
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accordance with the tort duty addressed in Goebel then both UTA and SLCSR owed such 
a tort duty and neither is entitled to indemnity from the other. (This issue is discussed 
further in Point II.) 
The statutory and ordinance based tort duty discussed in Goebel does not support 
UTA's position. This Court should not allow Goebel to blur its focus on the actual 
language of the Agreement. That language does not provide that SLCSR assumed the 
risk of addressing defects in the materials used for UTA's crossing surfaces, or otherwise 
ensuring that such crossings are gap-free for bicyclists in order for such crossings to be in 
compliance with any tort duty. 
G. SLCSR Cannot Be Liable to Indemnify UTA for its Loss or Damage 
from the Goebels' Action Because UTA Has Not Shown that SLCSR 
Alone Owed a Duty to Do What the Goebels Alleged the Parties Failed 
to Do. 
In conclusion, it is UTA who alone owed the relevant contractual duty to remedy 
the alleged defect that is the subject of the Goebels' action. SLCSR did not assume that 
particular duty. Therefore, SLCSR cannot be liable to UTA under Section 7.2(a). As 
discussed next, it is UTA who is liable to SLCSR under that indemnity provision. 
II. UTA AGREED TO INDEMNIFY SLCSR FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE 
RESULTING FROM CLAIMS BY BICYCLISTS FOR UNSAFE 
CROSSING SURFACE MATERIALS. 
As previously discussed, the Agreement provides that when there is a claim for 
"Loss or Damage" that "results from or arises in connection with .. . omissions of only 
one of the parties," such claim will be borne and paid by that particular party. Section 
7.2(a). This contractual allocation of responsibility to indemnify includes the duty to pay 
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defense expenses. Section 1 (definition of "Loss or Damage"). 
In this case, the claim for "Loss or Damage" was made by the parties against each 
other upon being sued by Goebels who were injured when Mr. Goebels' bicycle wheels 
allegedly fell into a gap between rubber panels at one of UTA's crossings. Those rubber 
panels were installed before 1992 which is when UTA purchased its railroad property. 
As between SLCSR and UTA, only UTA had the obligation to assure that its crossings, 
including on Joint Trackage, were reasonably safe for bicyclists in light of the materials 
making up the crossings it purchased, and in light of the necessary seams that existed 
because of those materials. Only UTA was replacing its crossing surfaces before the 
Goebels' accident. To rule otherwise would deny this undisputed fact and impose a 
contractual obligation onto SLCSR as if it were the property owner without any such 
agreement between the parties. There is no doubt that the particular omission that is at 
issue in this case was that of only UTA, and not SLCSR. Therefore, it is UTA who had 
and has the duty to defend and indemnify SLCSR with respect to the particular action 
brought against it by the Goebels resulting from UTA's omission. (Had UTA replaced 
this crossing before it replaced other crossings, there would have been no accident as the 
Goebels alleged, and no lawsuit against SLCSR.) 
If UTA is not found to be liable to SLCSR for SLCSR's Loss or Damage resulting 
from UTA's sole omission, then the only other conclusion is that neither party is entitled 
to indemnification. In no case can SLCSR be liable to UTA. 
UTA's argument against this alternative conclusion reveals that it does not 
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understand it. SLCSR's position is that it, not UTA, is entitled to indemnification. But if 
not, neither party is entitled to indemnification. This fall back position is made because 
of UTA's position that the Goebel decision, with respect to a tort duty imposed by law 
onto owners and operators of railroads, somehow creates a relevant duty and is 
controlling. (As previously discussed, no such duty could be relevant because if SLCSR 
owed a tort duty because it was an "operator," so does UTA owe a tort duty as the 
"owner." The statutory basis for the tort duty expressly states that it applies to "owners.") 
If a tort duty is owed by both parties, there can be no indemnification under Section 
7.2(a), the indemnity provision expressly relied upon by the parties. In that section, the 
omission has to be "of only one of the parties." However, because 7.2(a) applies 
"[notwithstanding . . . applicable law regarding allocation of liability based on fault or 
otherwise," and Section 7.3 further provides that "the judgment of any court to the 
contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding," SLCSR is 
entitled to indemnity from UTA who is the only party who contractually was obligated 
(despite any tort duty) to address materials and construction defects in its own grade 
crossing surfaces. 
In discussing its fallback position of no indemnity by either party, SLCSR also 
discussed the indemnity provisions of Sections 7.1 and 7.3, to show that they too are 
incapable of supporting a judgment for UTA. Again, this discussion is made because of 
the Goebel decision, and is not premised on ignoring that decision as argued by UTA. In 
light of Goebel specifically the holding that there is no liability to the Goebels, the 
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indemnity provision found at Section 7.1 does not provide for indemnity by either party. 
Section 7.1 only pertains to indemnity arising from a "failure of either party to comply 
with state and local laws and regulations." SLCSR has been held not to have violated any 
such law alleged by the Goebels to have been violated. Thus, at most, Section 7.1 would 
require UTA to indemnify SLCSR. If the Goebel holding exonerating SLCSR is 
extended to apply to UTA, neither party would be entitled to indemnity from the other 
because neither party violated a law or regulation. As to the indemnity provision found at 
Section 7.3, again because the Goebel holding exonerates the acts and omissions of both 
parties, there can be no indemnity by either party because the Goebels5 claim, and the 
Loss or Damage it caused both UTA and SLCSR, did not "result from or arise in 
connection with" any act or omission of either party as a matter of law. 
In summary, as to omissions, the indemnity provisions of the Agreement provide 
for indemnity only against the party who failed to do an act it also was supposed to do. 
There is no duty to defend just because someone makes an allegation. But if that 
allegation pertains to a duty that in fact was owed and breached by only one of the parties, 
that particular party agreed to bear and pay the Loss and Damage of the other party who 
did not owe or breach that duty. Since neither party has been found to owe a tort duty that 
it breached, neither party is entitled to indemnification from the other. In light of the 
Goebel ruling, these points are made only as an alternative basis for why no judgment can 
be affirmed for UTA should SLCSR not be entitled to indemnify from UTA. 
UTA alone had the obligation, and bore the contractual risk, to address defects in 
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the materials used in the construction of its crossing surfaces that jeopardized the safety 
of bicyclists. SLCSR did not contractually assume any such obligation. By retaining that 
obligation and risk, UTA agreed to indemnify SLCSR for any Loss or Damage resulting 
from claims by bicyclists for unsafe crossing surfaces due to defects that were not 
remedied. UTA breached its obligation by not replacing the subject crossing at an earlier 
date and thereby eliminating its alleged defects. Inasmuch as that is the substance of the 
Goebels5 claim against SLCSR and UTA, it is SLCSR who is entitled to indemnification 
from UTA, if anyone is entitled to indemnification, for the Loss and Damage SLCSR has 
suffered because of the Goebels' claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred. All of UTA's arguments fail, as discussed herein. Therefore, 
SLCSR respectfully requests that the judgment for UTA be reversed and that this action 
be remanded to the trial court with directions for the entry of judgment in favor of SLCSR 
and against UTA, and for a determination of SLCSR's recoverable damages. 
Alternatively, the judgment in favor of UTA should be reversed and neither party 
awarded indemnity from the other. 
DATED this h ^ day of October, 2005 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Southern 
Railroad Company, Inc. 
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